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Especially important is a personality sketch of Lucy. Who is he, what is his name, what were his circumstances earlier and what are they now, for what motives does he work for others and for us?

Answer this telegram in your own code. You do not need to inform Albert of our telegram or of your answer.

He has received directions, as well as telegrams coming directly from Sissy, without sending queries back [i. We send you the title of a new book for your code; buy it; we shall give you instructions about how to work according to the book.

Albert is not to know about the new book. Although Sissy and Paul had their own code, it appears that they did not have their own radio operator at this time and had to go through Rado; hence Moscow's assurances that Rado was not being curious or testy but rather was accepting this traffic, in a code that he could not read, without demur.

Gisela was one of three code names for Maria Josefovna Poliakova, the other two being Vera and Mildred. Mara was Sissy's daughter, Tamara Vigier. She fears that the Gestapo will thus come across her trail.

Maurice knows Sissy's true name. I have initiated discrete inquiries and shall report further. At the same time but independently in this event, Maurice was arrested in France.

For the time being, you must break off your connection with Sissy completely. She can be persuaded that it is in Taylor's interest to have a connection with someone else for a while.

Try to convince Sissy. Tell that it will be for only three months. Sissy could say it is because of Paul, who is under observation. She should keep her apartment absolutely clean and, above all else, not say a word too much.

It is best that Paul not sleep in the apartment. He was involved in courier and funding activity on behalf of Soviet intelligence during World War II.

There are conflicting reports about the date of Maurice's arrest by the Germans, one account dating it , another The latter is both more detailed and less derivative.

It is therefore concluded that the Maurice who knew Sissy and whom the Germans arrested in France may have been someone other than Aenis-Haenslin, who was released from a German concentration camp in Brandenburg in response to a Swiss demand.

At any rate, the traffic continued to mention Maurice and to reveal conflicting views about his arrest. On 8 July Poliakova repeated to Sissy, in the latter's code, some of the instructions radioed to Dora four days earlier.

Taylor and Lucy were to be turned over to someone else. They believe that the man who asked about them came from the Center and just handled himself clumsily.

They assume that the Center wants in this way to take away the Taylor group, and in such a manner that 1 too shall know nothing about it.

Presumably there were further exchanges, with Moscow insisting that Sissy identify Lucy and his sources and that she turn them over to Dora or someone else and with Sissy adamantly refusing, but these are not in our collection.

On 16 August , however, the Center sent Sissy, via Dora, a stern message which substituted the formal second person for the intimate and which appears to have been drawn up not by Poliakova but by her superiors:.

You, however, deny this possibility and interpret it as an attempt to take the Taylor group away from you. You must understand, inasmuch as you assume this position, that you know nothing of the danger which threatens you and Taylor's people, especially those in Germany.

Your behavior is frivolous and irresponsible. We demand that you recognize the seriousness of the situation and place full confidence in our statements.

Many thanks for your advice. I am myself convinced that much more could be gotten out of the Lucy group. However, I have no direct contact with this group, as you know, and every time that I try to intensify the group's activity I encounter in Sissy and her man 13 a resistance that I do not understand.

I remind you that when I noted the possibilities of this group a year ago, I had to hold with Sissy discussions that continued for months before she was prepared to take it over and use it.

Sissy and her man In accordance with your advice, I wrote Lucy a very friendly letter, but Sissy declared that Taylor could not pass it on because Lucy, beyond doubt, is already doing everything that he can.

Apparently Sissy and her man view the letter as an attempt by the Center or by me to set up a direct contact with the Lucy group. Your telegram was handed over to Paul.

Again he boasted in such a way that I had a hard time of it controlling myself. Again I beg you to release me from further contact with Paul.

In other words, Sissy and Paul still had no radio operator of their own but did not want to turn over their encoded messages to Dora for transmission by Edward Edmond Hamel and Maud Edmond's wife.

Foote, however, in a private interview held in , said that Pierre and Vita were Pierre Nicole and his wife. Pierre Nicole, born in , served as a cut-out between the Rote Drei and the Swiss Labor Party, which was extremely left-wing though not officially Communist.

The head of this party was Pierre's father, Leon, born in in Montcherend, Vaud. He and Pierre were in touch with Dora, Sissy, and Jim.

The identity of Ignatz is not known. He could have been Leon Nicole or any one of several other Swiss Communists. By 5 November the danger signs had multiplied, and Moscow feared that Rado might be arrested, leaving the Center cut off from Lucy's information.

It therefore repeated the proposal that Sissy and Jim be placed in direct contact, so that if anything happened to Dora, Jim could still maintain the flow of intelligence.

On 10 November Dora replied that Jim was in serious danger. On 28 November the Director instructed Dora to tell Sissy and Pakbo to work independently for a time.

The most important information was to go through Jim. What Moscow obviously did not know was that Jim had been arrested eight days earlier.

The fourth key personality in the Red Three was Alexander Rado, the Hungarian cartographer who took over the direction of the net from Maria Poliakova and who assumed contact with Ursula Hamburger's sources after she left Switzerland for England at the end of Rado's story is well-known and is retold here only in the barest outline.

He was born 1 September in Upjest, Hungary. It is almost certain that he was already working for Soviet military intelligence when he left Paris for Geneva in Rado and Ursula Hamburger worked independently of each other until the fall of France in June because Rado had been able until then to send his reports to Moscow via microfilm carried by couriers to Paris.

When the Germans occupied France, Moscow ordered Hamburger to make contact with Rado and place the transmitter of her new husband, Leon Charles Beurton, at Rado's disposal.

Hamburger had trained both Foote and Beurton in operating a transmitter, and they in turn trained the Hamels and Margarete Bolli.

In Moscow resolved a struggle for power by subordinating Duebendorfer to Rado. One report has Poliakova going to Switzerland for the purpose.

But Rado's authority was not absolute, and the fact that the Center gave Duebendorfer a code of her own and sometimes by-passed Rado when communicating with Sissy shows that the Soviets did not intend to let Rado consolidatc his position completely.

Dora, a simple anagram for Rado, is the sender or recipient of almost all the Rote Drei messages. The only exceptions are those sent or received directly by Sissy and those sent by Albert or by the Center but mentioning Albert in the text.

There is no doubt that Albert, like Dora, is Rado; but efforts to find a pattern or significance in Rado's choice of cover name for a particular message have not been successful.

Albert, like Dora, sends standard OB messages. The shift in names does not indicate a parallel shift in transmitters, because both "Dora" and "Albert" messages were found at their flat when the Hamels were arrested.

The possibility that "Dora" is Rado as chief of the Rote Drei and "Albert" is Rado as an individual disintegrates when checked against the traffic.

Flicke postulated a secretary who as Albert signed messages for Rado when be was away; but no one else ever heard of such a secretary, and Dora and Albert messages were sometimes transmitted on the same day.

So the mystery is unsolved. All concerned should be aware that Foote—who disliked Rado—minimized his role in the Rote Drei, attacked his personal integrity on dubious grounds, and erroneously believed him executed in the USSR, whereas in fact Rado is flourishing as a cartographer in Hungary and Foote is dead.

Dora had two other key sources who, like Sissy, provided him with intelligence from sub-sources. The Center thought highly of Taylor, chiefly because Moscow misunderstood his role.

The first reference to him in our holdings is in a message sent by the Director to Dora on 8 October The message terms him a new source, although in fact he was merely a go-between.

On 20 October the Director told Dora to identify Taylor's sources, not knowing that the sources "belonged" to Lucy, not Taylor.

A week later Moscow again asked for the identities of Taylor's sources. By February the Center's follow-up questions were directed to Lucy, with scant mention of Taylor.

That the Soviets continued to overestimate Taylor's importance is nevertheless evident in a Director-to-Dora message of 6 October which suggested that the work of the Lucy-Taylor group might be continued after the war ended and which promised Taylor an income for life if he agreed.

Perhaps Sissy misrepresented to Moscow the insignificant role that Taylor actually had, perhaps she merely kept stubbornly silent about such facts, or perhaps she misunderstood the true situation because she was in touch only with Taylor and not with Lucy.

In only one sense was Lucy important. If Rudolf Roessler had not been living in Switzerland during the second world war, his sources in Germany might have found it troublesome or even impossible to get their reports into Soviet hands.

In fact, they might not have cared much one way or the other about Soviet reception of their material, as long as it went to the Western allies.

But as was pointed out in the recent review of Accoce and Quet, 16 the widely accepted story that Lucy was a master spy is nothing but a myth.

As we have seen, the Center tried to eliminate Sissy and put Dora in direct contact with Taylor and Lucy.

If this maneuver had succeeded, it is probable that Dora would have been instructed to pressure Lucy to divulge his sources, whose identities Moscow had already requested again and again.

And if Lucy had yielded, then the truth would have been apparent: Lucy's true function was no different from that of Taylor. Both were mere cut-outs.

What made Lucy and Taylor important and what made Sissy important was a small band of Germans, Lucy's sources. The record clearly shows that Lucy had four important sources: These four were probably not the only sources reporting to Lucy; Lucy was not the only source reporting to Sissy; and Sissy was not the only principal agent funneling reports from a network to Rado.

We do not know the identities of any of them. We can, however, dismiss the theory of Foote and some later writers that these cover names merely referred to the source's access rather than his identity, so that Werther stood for Wehrmacht, Olga for Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Anna for the Auswertige Amt Foreign Office , etc.

There is nothing in the traffic to support this theory, which seems to be based on speculation only. All Rote Drei code names for which true identities have been established were designators of individuals per se , not of types of cover or access.

Despite the printed assertions to the contrary, Rudolf Roessler did divulge the identity of his sources, or at least of some of them.

Three and a half years before his death he provided identifying information about four of his chief sources to a trusted friend.

Lucy's confidant garbled the first identification and may have done the same with the fourth. Canaris took charge of the Abwehr on 1 January His predecessor was not a major but another admiral, Conrad Patzig.

But Hans Oster was a major in the Abwehr at that time, and he remained in the service, in which he served as the chief of staff and also as the heart of the 20th of July group which conspired to overthrow and assassinate Hitler.

A number of commentators have noted how well-informed Oster was. His knowledge of state secrets extended even to those held by the bitterest enemies of the Abwehr, the Gestapo and the Nazi security service, called the SD for Sicherheitsdienst.

The fact that Oster was prepared to provide Germany's enemies with information which was of crucial importance, even though they lacked the power to make full use of it, is also well-established.

Abshagen 22 reported that Oster gave Sas this warning on 3 April for relay to Norway and also told Sas of the invasion of Holland before the event.

In fact, Oster had begun to send specific, factual warnings to the West as early as The man who had become a major in , a lieutenant colonel in , a colonel in , and a major general in was unswerving in his detestation of German fascism and in his conviction that morality necessitated action.

As time passed and Hitler's power grew, Oster became convinced that the plots to eradicate the Nazis through the internal intervention of German armed forces would fail because of the waverings of the German generals.

He warned the West because he recognized that Hitler could not be brought down inside the Reich until he had been defeated on the battlefields.

Most contemporary German historians boggle at this point. They write in detail about the 20th of July conspiracy but gloss over the fact that from until his discharge from the Abwehr on 31 March , 23 when he was placed under house arrest in Schnaditz, near Leipzig, Oster was furnishing vital information to Germany's foes and was therefore—at least in Nazi eyes—engaged in high treason.

How did Oster obtain information? Gisevius 24 said, "Oster Oster seemed to be organizing an intelligence service of his own, within the counter-intelligence service.

One of the most important of his activities was to install his own confidential agents in the most diverse positions.

These men, and others like them, were active members of the conspiracy; most of them were executed by the Nazis. And they were in a position to have direct access to precisely the kind of information reported by Lucy's sources.

How did the information reach Lucy? Here too we can only speculate. A biographic summary of Oster in the International Biographic Archives 25 includes the following: He spared neither effort nor risk to set up connections between military and civilian resistance groups.

Gisevius 26 adds, "He once described to me in one sentence his own conception of his function within the Resistance movement.

He was standing at his desk looking down pensively at the four or five telephones whose secret circuits connected him with the most diverse authorities.

Oster had the entire communications network of the Abwehr at his disposal, and he used it to support the anti-Nazi cause. As was noted earlier in this study, the timing of Rote Drei messages would have permitted sending almost all of the traffic through Abwehr courier channels from Germany to Switzerland.

We know that Gisevius had access at least twice and sometimes three times a week to a courier pouch from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the German Embassy in Bern.

At least every other day Gisevius was also served by an OKW courier as the result of a procedure instituted by Oster. And for urgent messages Oster or a cohort could safely use an Abwehr telephone.

How the Abwehr's lines were shielded against Gestapo and SD monitoring is not known, at least by this writer; but that they were so shielded is demonstrated by the conspirators' uninhibited use of telephones and the survival of the group until 20 July In brief, even if Lucy had not listed "Canaris' predecessor," Gisevius, and Carl Goerdeler, all key figures in the 20th of July group, as having been among his sources, the characteristics of the Lucy messages and of their transmission from Germany to Switzerland suggest that Werther and the others probably had Abwehr communications channels at their disposal.

There seems to be no plausible alternative theory. Gisevius has told much of his own story in To the Bitter End, but like other Germans he stresses the resistance activity of the underground and says little about espionage.

There are a few exceptions. Speaking of the 20th of July conspiracy, Gisevius says, "We had our spies everywhere—in the war ministry, the police headquarters, the ministry of the interior, and especially in the foreign office.

All the various threads came together in Oster's office. Gisevius entered the Abwehr in or ; and when Paris fell, Canaris and Oster sent him to Zurich with the cover of a vice-consul.

But even before the war started, Gisevius had started to make trips to Switzerland to meet with representatives of the Western Allies.

He says, "We had decided to meet in Switzerland after the 'March Madness. I was glad of the opportunity to complete my notes on the French crisis.

Goerdeler intended to stay around Berlin until the end of the Czech crisis; then he planned to follow us as soon as possible. Gerhard Ritter 31 tells of another, similar meeting which occurred some months later, in February He says that the ex-Chancellor of Germany, Josef Wirth, had emigrated to Switzerland and had offered to act as an intermediary between the British and the German antiFascists.

In mid-February two Foreign Office representatives, friends of [Sir Robert] Vansittart, met Wirth at Ouchy and another man well-known in London who had, since war broke out, lived in Lucerne and from there had kept up his connections with friends in Britain.

The other man could have been Michel, Freiherr von Godin, or Lucy himself, or any of several other Germans who, like Wirth, were living in Lucerne.

Wirth also appears in Rote Drei traffic. On 14 January the Center sent the following message to Dora:. Especially interested in contents of Wirth's negotiations with the Anglo-Saxons and his intentions regarding negotiations with the USSR.

What does he plan to do, as a practical matter, to establish contact? Does he believe that they are true?

Long absolutely must report clearly about the intent of Rot's group to orient itself toward the Soviet Union. Is it possible that at the present time there exists an organized opposition of commanding officers against Hitler?

What is the picture in respect to reserves in Germany? How does the OKW react to the Russian offensive? What are the plans and intentions of the OKW for the next few months?

Because of their great importance, request a good check on all these questions and a prompt answer. Moscow directed that the requirements be levied upon Lucy's group and added, " Only operations of modest proportions are planned.

The so-called second echelon of generals [literally, generals in second-best uniforms] who already wanted to take action against Hitler in January, has now decided to liquidate Hitler and also his supporters.

An earlier attempt failed because Hitler was warned by Manstein. On 5 October the following went from Dora to Director: Wirth rejects the German Liberation Committee [the reference is to the "National Committee of Free Germany," created by the Russians] in Moscow because it hinders instead of hastening the disintegration of the Nazi regime.

Those who feel partially responsible for the establishment of that regime will cooperate more closely with the Nazi leaders.

Bourgeois German Democrats are prepared to collaborate with German Communists but not under Soviet guidance.

Therefore they reject the Moscow Committee. On the basis of these messages and of the scanty information about the movements and activities of Gisevius in Switzerland, it is suggested that Gisevius may have been Rot.

Gisevius knew Roessler, which may well explain why Lucy identified him correctly as a source but failed to list Oster, whom he had never met, by name.

Gisevius also knew Wirth, whose link to the 20th of July group had been sanctioned by Generals Oster and Beck. He obviously knew Carl Goerdeler, one of the most important of the conspirators.

Gisevius was sympathetic toward the Soviet cause, a fact which became more apparent after the war than it was during it.

He was thoroughly trained in clandestinity as a result of his role in the 20th of July group, his three and a half years as an agent of British intelligence, and his work for OSS in Switzerland.

It seems probable that people like Goerdeler and Beck, who themselves favored the Western solution—i.

There is one difficulty inherent in the theory that Rot was Gisevius. As was said earlier, Lucy named Gisevius as one of his sources.

Rot, however, seems to have been a source of Long rather than Lucy. Because Lucy and Sissy succeeded in concealing the identities of the Lucy group from the Russians, the dual role of Gisevius in the Rote Drei, if he did in fact play such a role, would not have come to light.

The third man named by Roessler as one of his sources was Carl Goerdeler, who had been Lord Mayor of Leipzig from to , when he resigned and broke with the Nazis.

A conservative visionary, a Protestant monarchist, a headstrong philosopher, Goerdeler remained a civilian all his life.

All of the information provided to Moscow by Lucy could have been obtained more readily, more securely, in greater detail, and at a higher level from leading military figures in the resistance than from Carl Goerdeler.

It seems probable that Roessler named him just because he knew him personally, as he knew Gisevius.

Whatever information Goerdeler provided, he must have obtained it from fellow conspirators, not from direct access. It is therefore not possible to draw any logical inferences about which cover name, if any, referred to Goerdeler.

The fourth source named by Lucy was "General Boelitz deceased. There was a Dr. In 19,34 he was a Kulturrat advisor on cultural matters and a member of the German Foreign Institute.

He was also the first director of the Ibero-American Institute in Berlin. Sometime during Dr. Boelitz fell into the bad graces of the Nazis and was replaced as head of the Ibero-American Institute by a general named Faupel.

Thereafter, one report suggests, the institute was used by the Nazis in support of espionage and subversion in Latin America.

Otto Boelitz died in Germany on 29 December No record linking him to Roessler on the one hand, or to Oster, Goerdeler, or any other member of the 20th of July group on the other, has been found thus far.

There remains, however, the possibility of another garble. From to he headed the ciphers department Chiffrierstelle of the OKW.

Thereafter he was commanding officer of the intelligence evaluation office of the Southeast Army Group, Athens, where he remained until He had ties to Canaris and Oster.

And a German first lieutenant of the signal corps, interrogated in April , described Colonel Boetzel as an anti-Nazi. We have no basis for matching true and cover names, although Oster seems the likeliest candidate for Werther.

To continue, the contacts of "Sissy"—Rachel Duebendorfer—fell into three categories. Sissy resisted strenuously every effort of Moscow and Rado to determine the identities of the members of the Taylor-Lucy team, and it is fair to conjecture that a major reason for her resistance was that had she lost this remarkable asset, she'd have had little enough left.

For the second group was composed of peripheral people probably turned over to Sissy by Vera Poliakova before the War. And the third element was made up of Sissy's own family; the man with whom she was living, Paul Goettcher; her daughter and the daughter's husband; and a cousin.

Alexander Rado had two other principal agents. One of them, Georges Blun, code-named Long, was a French journalist whose subsources could not match the production of Lucy's group in quality or quantity, but who was nevertheless a valuable asset for the Soviets.

The other was Otto Puenter, or Pakbo. The sources who had aliases and who are known to have been members of Long's group were Agnes, Kurz, Grau, Rot, Fanny, and possibly Feld.

With the exception of the last-named, a courier, the members of the group have a certain homogeneous quality. They were not military professionals like Werther, Teddy, and the rest.

Three of them, including Long, were professional journalists. Most of them worked for two or more intelligence services.

Their political views and their motivation often seem ambiguous and devious, if not opportunistic. The first of Long's sub-sources, Agnes, was a journalist named Ernst Lemmer.

Some information about him is included here not because his WW II career as a spy was of any particular moment, but because his work for Lucy spanned a long period, including the second, post-war phase of Lucy's career in espionage.

Lemmer represented a Zurich newspaper in Berlin and travelled to Switzerland repeatedly. He first appears in our holdings in a message of 22 October , Dora to Director.

Long is listed as the source and Lemmer, who is said to have obtained the information from the Foreign Ministry, as the sub-source.

The information concerned the siege of Moscow. The message ends with "In the future I shall call him [Lemmer] Agnes.

The dates are 13 August and 18 September , and the messages are merely reports of the lack of morale at the German home front.

Lemmer was born on 28 April in Remscheidt, Germany although Dallin, for some unknown reason, thought that he was born in Odessa and lived in Russia for 17 years.

He attended the Universities of Marburg and Frankfurt am Main. In he was elected as a DDP representative to the Reichstag and thus became the youngest member of that body.

He lost these posts when the Nazis seized power, and he was forbidden to write for any newspaper published in Germany.

After the war Lemmer was accused in West Germany of having collaborated with the Nazis. He settled immediately after the war in the Berlin suburb of Klein-Machnow, in the Soviet sector, where he owned a house.

He was also deputy mayor of Klein-Machnow. He was in close and cordial contact with leading members of the Soviet military occupation.

On 20 December , however, the Soviet authorities removed Lemmer from the vice-chairmansbip of the CDU, ostensibly because of policy conflicts.

In November he was appointed Minister of Postal and Telecommunications. One report of that period stated innocently, "Lemmer He is currently listed as a retired Cabinet Minister who last held public office in The same source who repeated the identities of the four World War II sources whom Lucy had named to him also said that Lemmer was a source for Lucy during the period when Lucy and Xaver Schnieper worked for Czech intelligence.

The post-war charges of collaboration with the Nazis, which Lemrner denied and outrode, seem to have been true. Pakbo was of less value to Rado and the Soviets than was Long, just as Long and his group did not measure up to Sissy and her sources.

Reportedly he was a secret member of the Swiss Communist Party. He was in contact with the Swiss military intelligence service, which used him as a channel to pass to the Soviets selected items of intelhgence.

Dallin has devoted an entire chapter to Puenter, 36 but much of what appears therein is false. Puenter has, in fact, made many false statements.

He asserted that he kept in a monastery in Switzerland the entire plan for the German attack upon Stalingrad in October , which he himself encoded before passing it to Rado.

He said that Lucy was a Czech. He wove a complex and fascinating tale about a young Austrian radio operator who came from Dombirn, near the Austro-Swiss border.

He had promised the home folks that he would transmit his location every night, just so that they would know where he was.

He chanced to be assigned to Hitler's headquarters, with the result that Pakbo always knew the Fuehrer's whereabouts. The implausibility of this fable is, however, no greater than that inherent in his explanation of his cover name.

Actually, it is unlikely that he had teams of agents anywhere, and certainly improbable that they would be located at the unimportant places named.

As a matter of fact, most of his contacts lived in Bern and Geneva. Puenter has alleged that early in a Gaullist reported to him that the Swiss service had received accurate information about Hitler's plan to attack the USSR in a month or a month and a half.

The Gaullist said he was looking for a contact with Moscow to pass on the information. Pakbo went to Rado to deliver the story—i.

Rado asked who was the source. Pakbo in turn inquired and was told that the man's name was Roessler.

Rado then decided to get in direct contact with Roessler, and that connection continued thenceforth.

This is Pakbo's genius for fabrication at its best. In neither Lucy nor Pakbo himself had any connection with the Rote Drei.

A Dora to Director message of 15 July included the following: Secondly, Puenter has said in writing that he had never been in contact with Roessler and did not know his true name.

Thirdly, Lucy did not meet Rado through Puenter for the simple reason that he never met Rado at all, as the traffic shows.

The question that naturally arises, then, is this: If Pakbo has told lies about important matters after the war, did he also lie to the Soviets during the war?

Apart from a challenge on 7 October , the Soviets seem to have accepted Pakbo's reports as valid and to have found them useful.

Perhaps Pakbo, like Jim, merely tried to exaggerate the importance of his role after the war had ended. Pakbo appears in 22 known messages, but only 6 of these contain any substantive information.

The time span is from 15 July to 8 January Apparently he learned something about the Rote Kapelle arrests in Germany and reported accordingly, because on 5 October the Director asked for more information.

And he also reported the arrest of Paul Boettcher, because on 8 January Moscow said, "As far as we know, Pakbo has never heard of Paul.

How does it happen that he has heard so certainly about Paul's arrest? His chief sub-source was Salter, whose identity has not been firmly established 37 but who may have been Louis Suss, born 6 October in Beblenbeim, Alsace-Lorraine.

A French citizen, Suss died in Switzerland on 25 April There were two children, Christiane and Louis Michel. She was observed in at a meeting with a Soviet representative to the UN who is also a suspected intelligence operative.

Salter appeared in ten messages. He was in contact with former chancellor Josef Wirth and with British intelligence. He also knew Long and Kurz; in fact, compartmentation was often breached in the Rote Drei network.

One report says that a Professor Andre Oltramare and his son, Dr. Marc Oltramare, both passed intelligence to Puenter during the war and that he relayed their information to the Soviets.

Andre Oltramare was a professor at the University of Geneva, where he lived with Jeanne Hersch, a philosopher much younger than he.

At one time he was president or vice-president of the Geneva chapter of the Socialist Party. Among his associates in were Jean Vincent, Max Horngacher, and Maurice Ducommun, all of whom were suspected of being Soviet agents.

One Mario Bodenmann, a Swiss Socialist and journalist, has also been reported as a sub-source for Pakbo. A probable Pakbo source was "Bruder," who appears in only two messages, both from Dora to Director, dated 27 January and 10 May Both messages provide information about the production at the Oerlikon arms factory in Switzerland.

The president of Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik Oerlikon, Buehrle and Co. In middle and late , as Foote has also related, the network was extremely short of funds.

Pakbo and others solicited funds from Swiss businessmen, promising profitable post-war commercial orders from the USSR in exchange.

After the war the Soviets refused to honor the obligations incurred on behalf of the Rote Drei. Most of the businessmen complained bitterly, and Pakbo has alleged that he made some effort to repay the loans that he had personally solicited.

Buehrle, however, merely wrote off the loss. Despite published claims to the contrary, there is no reason to believe that a source called "Lily of the Vatican" ever existed.

Pakbo has denied that he had a line to the Vatican. Foote claimed in Handbook for Spies that he and Rado were equals, or nearly equals, each having his own network, code, and communications system.

The truth, however, is that Foote, like Puenter, grossly exaggerated his wartime importance. The traffic does not bear out Foote's claim that he had sub-sources of his own.

On the contrary, Moscow clearly regarded him primarily as a W T operator, although the most senior member in that category, and secondarily as a support man expected to give Rado help in problems of funding.

Foote, whose cover name was Jim, appears 20 times in the messages in our possession. The time span is 31 October to 14 April These messages contain no new information, but they are of value in reducing Jim's self-portrait to its true, minor dimensions.

Now that part of the Rote Drei structure has been partially excavated and cleansed of distortions, the outline of the whole can be delineated.

Alexander Rado is at the apex of the network, having inherited the leader's role from Maria Poliakova and Ursula Beurton.

Rado had three principal sources: Each of these had a network of sub-agents. Through Christian Schneider and Rudolf Roessler, Duebendorfer was in touch with the most important sources in the entire network: Werther, Teddy, Anna, and Olga.

The third principal agent, Otto Puenter, alias Pakbo, headed a net that included Salter and Bruder, as well as others whose cover names are not known.

Alexander Foote, alias Jim, was the most important of the radio operators. To this point we have viewed the Red Three network chiefly as an apparatus which produced intelligence for the Soviet military service.

But Lucy's information, some or all of Longs, and probably Pakbo s also went to the West. The vital product, Lucy's, reached the Allies through a Czech colonel whose true name was Karel Sedlacek and whose alias was Uncle Tom.

We have his story from General Frantisek Moravec, who as Sedlacek's superior had sent him to Switzerland in the first place. In Sedlacek was working in Southern Bohemia as an intelligence officer whose targets were in Bavaria.

His talents and skill caught Moravec's eye, and Sedlacek was sent to Prague for a year's training in operating a WJT set, secret writing, and encoding and decoding.

He was already fluent in German. In June , his training completed and his cover prepared, Sedlacek left Czechoslovakia as Karl Seltzinger, a correspondent of the Prague newspaper Narodni Listy.

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Those who feel partially responsible for the establishment of that regime will cooperate more closely with the Nazi leaders. Bourgeois German Democrats are prepared to collaborate with German Communists but not under Soviet guidance.

Therefore they reject the Moscow Committee. On the basis of these messages and of the scanty information about the movements and activities of Gisevius in Switzerland, it is suggested that Gisevius may have been Rot.

Gisevius knew Roessler, which may well explain why Lucy identified him correctly as a source but failed to list Oster, whom he had never met, by name.

Gisevius also knew Wirth, whose link to the 20th of July group had been sanctioned by Generals Oster and Beck. He obviously knew Carl Goerdeler, one of the most important of the conspirators.

Gisevius was sympathetic toward the Soviet cause, a fact which became more apparent after the war than it was during it.

He was thoroughly trained in clandestinity as a result of his role in the 20th of July group, his three and a half years as an agent of British intelligence, and his work for OSS in Switzerland.

It seems probable that people like Goerdeler and Beck, who themselves favored the Western solution—i. There is one difficulty inherent in the theory that Rot was Gisevius.

As was said earlier, Lucy named Gisevius as one of his sources. Rot, however, seems to have been a source of Long rather than Lucy.

Because Lucy and Sissy succeeded in concealing the identities of the Lucy group from the Russians, the dual role of Gisevius in the Rote Drei, if he did in fact play such a role, would not have come to light.

The third man named by Roessler as one of his sources was Carl Goerdeler, who had been Lord Mayor of Leipzig from to , when he resigned and broke with the Nazis.

A conservative visionary, a Protestant monarchist, a headstrong philosopher, Goerdeler remained a civilian all his life. All of the information provided to Moscow by Lucy could have been obtained more readily, more securely, in greater detail, and at a higher level from leading military figures in the resistance than from Carl Goerdeler.

It seems probable that Roessler named him just because he knew him personally, as he knew Gisevius.

Whatever information Goerdeler provided, he must have obtained it from fellow conspirators, not from direct access. It is therefore not possible to draw any logical inferences about which cover name, if any, referred to Goerdeler.

The fourth source named by Lucy was "General Boelitz deceased. There was a Dr. In 19,34 he was a Kulturrat advisor on cultural matters and a member of the German Foreign Institute.

He was also the first director of the Ibero-American Institute in Berlin. Sometime during Dr. Boelitz fell into the bad graces of the Nazis and was replaced as head of the Ibero-American Institute by a general named Faupel.

Thereafter, one report suggests, the institute was used by the Nazis in support of espionage and subversion in Latin America.

Otto Boelitz died in Germany on 29 December No record linking him to Roessler on the one hand, or to Oster, Goerdeler, or any other member of the 20th of July group on the other, has been found thus far.

There remains, however, the possibility of another garble. From to he headed the ciphers department Chiffrierstelle of the OKW.

Thereafter he was commanding officer of the intelligence evaluation office of the Southeast Army Group, Athens, where he remained until He had ties to Canaris and Oster.

And a German first lieutenant of the signal corps, interrogated in April , described Colonel Boetzel as an anti-Nazi.

We have no basis for matching true and cover names, although Oster seems the likeliest candidate for Werther. To continue, the contacts of "Sissy"—Rachel Duebendorfer—fell into three categories.

Sissy resisted strenuously every effort of Moscow and Rado to determine the identities of the members of the Taylor-Lucy team, and it is fair to conjecture that a major reason for her resistance was that had she lost this remarkable asset, she'd have had little enough left.

For the second group was composed of peripheral people probably turned over to Sissy by Vera Poliakova before the War. And the third element was made up of Sissy's own family; the man with whom she was living, Paul Goettcher; her daughter and the daughter's husband; and a cousin.

Alexander Rado had two other principal agents. One of them, Georges Blun, code-named Long, was a French journalist whose subsources could not match the production of Lucy's group in quality or quantity, but who was nevertheless a valuable asset for the Soviets.

The other was Otto Puenter, or Pakbo. The sources who had aliases and who are known to have been members of Long's group were Agnes, Kurz, Grau, Rot, Fanny, and possibly Feld.

With the exception of the last-named, a courier, the members of the group have a certain homogeneous quality. They were not military professionals like Werther, Teddy, and the rest.

Three of them, including Long, were professional journalists. Most of them worked for two or more intelligence services. Their political views and their motivation often seem ambiguous and devious, if not opportunistic.

The first of Long's sub-sources, Agnes, was a journalist named Ernst Lemmer. Some information about him is included here not because his WW II career as a spy was of any particular moment, but because his work for Lucy spanned a long period, including the second, post-war phase of Lucy's career in espionage.

Lemmer represented a Zurich newspaper in Berlin and travelled to Switzerland repeatedly. He first appears in our holdings in a message of 22 October , Dora to Director.

Long is listed as the source and Lemmer, who is said to have obtained the information from the Foreign Ministry, as the sub-source.

The information concerned the siege of Moscow. The message ends with "In the future I shall call him [Lemmer] Agnes. The dates are 13 August and 18 September , and the messages are merely reports of the lack of morale at the German home front.

Lemmer was born on 28 April in Remscheidt, Germany although Dallin, for some unknown reason, thought that he was born in Odessa and lived in Russia for 17 years.

He attended the Universities of Marburg and Frankfurt am Main. In he was elected as a DDP representative to the Reichstag and thus became the youngest member of that body.

He lost these posts when the Nazis seized power, and he was forbidden to write for any newspaper published in Germany. After the war Lemmer was accused in West Germany of having collaborated with the Nazis.

He settled immediately after the war in the Berlin suburb of Klein-Machnow, in the Soviet sector, where he owned a house.

He was also deputy mayor of Klein-Machnow. He was in close and cordial contact with leading members of the Soviet military occupation. On 20 December , however, the Soviet authorities removed Lemmer from the vice-chairmansbip of the CDU, ostensibly because of policy conflicts.

In November he was appointed Minister of Postal and Telecommunications. One report of that period stated innocently, "Lemmer He is currently listed as a retired Cabinet Minister who last held public office in The same source who repeated the identities of the four World War II sources whom Lucy had named to him also said that Lemmer was a source for Lucy during the period when Lucy and Xaver Schnieper worked for Czech intelligence.

The post-war charges of collaboration with the Nazis, which Lemrner denied and outrode, seem to have been true. Pakbo was of less value to Rado and the Soviets than was Long, just as Long and his group did not measure up to Sissy and her sources.

Reportedly he was a secret member of the Swiss Communist Party. He was in contact with the Swiss military intelligence service, which used him as a channel to pass to the Soviets selected items of intelhgence.

Dallin has devoted an entire chapter to Puenter, 36 but much of what appears therein is false. Puenter has, in fact, made many false statements.

He asserted that he kept in a monastery in Switzerland the entire plan for the German attack upon Stalingrad in October , which he himself encoded before passing it to Rado.

He said that Lucy was a Czech. He wove a complex and fascinating tale about a young Austrian radio operator who came from Dombirn, near the Austro-Swiss border.

He had promised the home folks that he would transmit his location every night, just so that they would know where he was.

He chanced to be assigned to Hitler's headquarters, with the result that Pakbo always knew the Fuehrer's whereabouts. The implausibility of this fable is, however, no greater than that inherent in his explanation of his cover name.

Actually, it is unlikely that he had teams of agents anywhere, and certainly improbable that they would be located at the unimportant places named.

As a matter of fact, most of his contacts lived in Bern and Geneva. Puenter has alleged that early in a Gaullist reported to him that the Swiss service had received accurate information about Hitler's plan to attack the USSR in a month or a month and a half.

The Gaullist said he was looking for a contact with Moscow to pass on the information. Pakbo went to Rado to deliver the story—i.

Rado asked who was the source. Pakbo in turn inquired and was told that the man's name was Roessler. Rado then decided to get in direct contact with Roessler, and that connection continued thenceforth.

This is Pakbo's genius for fabrication at its best. In neither Lucy nor Pakbo himself had any connection with the Rote Drei.

A Dora to Director message of 15 July included the following: Secondly, Puenter has said in writing that he had never been in contact with Roessler and did not know his true name.

Thirdly, Lucy did not meet Rado through Puenter for the simple reason that he never met Rado at all, as the traffic shows. The question that naturally arises, then, is this: If Pakbo has told lies about important matters after the war, did he also lie to the Soviets during the war?

Apart from a challenge on 7 October , the Soviets seem to have accepted Pakbo's reports as valid and to have found them useful.

Perhaps Pakbo, like Jim, merely tried to exaggerate the importance of his role after the war had ended. Pakbo appears in 22 known messages, but only 6 of these contain any substantive information.

The time span is from 15 July to 8 January Apparently he learned something about the Rote Kapelle arrests in Germany and reported accordingly, because on 5 October the Director asked for more information.

And he also reported the arrest of Paul Boettcher, because on 8 January Moscow said, "As far as we know, Pakbo has never heard of Paul.

How does it happen that he has heard so certainly about Paul's arrest? His chief sub-source was Salter, whose identity has not been firmly established 37 but who may have been Louis Suss, born 6 October in Beblenbeim, Alsace-Lorraine.

A French citizen, Suss died in Switzerland on 25 April There were two children, Christiane and Louis Michel. She was observed in at a meeting with a Soviet representative to the UN who is also a suspected intelligence operative.

Salter appeared in ten messages. He was in contact with former chancellor Josef Wirth and with British intelligence. He also knew Long and Kurz; in fact, compartmentation was often breached in the Rote Drei network.

One report says that a Professor Andre Oltramare and his son, Dr. Marc Oltramare, both passed intelligence to Puenter during the war and that he relayed their information to the Soviets.

Andre Oltramare was a professor at the University of Geneva, where he lived with Jeanne Hersch, a philosopher much younger than he.

At one time he was president or vice-president of the Geneva chapter of the Socialist Party. Among his associates in were Jean Vincent, Max Horngacher, and Maurice Ducommun, all of whom were suspected of being Soviet agents.

One Mario Bodenmann, a Swiss Socialist and journalist, has also been reported as a sub-source for Pakbo. A probable Pakbo source was "Bruder," who appears in only two messages, both from Dora to Director, dated 27 January and 10 May Both messages provide information about the production at the Oerlikon arms factory in Switzerland.

The president of Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik Oerlikon, Buehrle and Co. In middle and late , as Foote has also related, the network was extremely short of funds.

Pakbo and others solicited funds from Swiss businessmen, promising profitable post-war commercial orders from the USSR in exchange.

After the war the Soviets refused to honor the obligations incurred on behalf of the Rote Drei. Most of the businessmen complained bitterly, and Pakbo has alleged that he made some effort to repay the loans that he had personally solicited.

Buehrle, however, merely wrote off the loss. Despite published claims to the contrary, there is no reason to believe that a source called "Lily of the Vatican" ever existed.

Pakbo has denied that he had a line to the Vatican. Foote claimed in Handbook for Spies that he and Rado were equals, or nearly equals, each having his own network, code, and communications system.

The truth, however, is that Foote, like Puenter, grossly exaggerated his wartime importance. The traffic does not bear out Foote's claim that he had sub-sources of his own.

On the contrary, Moscow clearly regarded him primarily as a W T operator, although the most senior member in that category, and secondarily as a support man expected to give Rado help in problems of funding.

Foote, whose cover name was Jim, appears 20 times in the messages in our possession. The time span is 31 October to 14 April These messages contain no new information, but they are of value in reducing Jim's self-portrait to its true, minor dimensions.

Now that part of the Rote Drei structure has been partially excavated and cleansed of distortions, the outline of the whole can be delineated.

Alexander Rado is at the apex of the network, having inherited the leader's role from Maria Poliakova and Ursula Beurton. Rado had three principal sources: Each of these had a network of sub-agents.

Through Christian Schneider and Rudolf Roessler, Duebendorfer was in touch with the most important sources in the entire network: Werther, Teddy, Anna, and Olga.

The third principal agent, Otto Puenter, alias Pakbo, headed a net that included Salter and Bruder, as well as others whose cover names are not known.

Alexander Foote, alias Jim, was the most important of the radio operators. To this point we have viewed the Red Three network chiefly as an apparatus which produced intelligence for the Soviet military service.

But Lucy's information, some or all of Longs, and probably Pakbo s also went to the West. The vital product, Lucy's, reached the Allies through a Czech colonel whose true name was Karel Sedlacek and whose alias was Uncle Tom.

We have his story from General Frantisek Moravec, who as Sedlacek's superior had sent him to Switzerland in the first place. In Sedlacek was working in Southern Bohemia as an intelligence officer whose targets were in Bavaria.

His talents and skill caught Moravec's eye, and Sedlacek was sent to Prague for a year's training in operating a WJT set, secret writing, and encoding and decoding.

He was already fluent in German. In June , his training completed and his cover prepared, Sedlacek left Czechoslovakia as Karl Seltzinger, a correspondent of the Prague newspaper Narodni Listy.

For more than a year he built his cover in Zurich; then, by the fall of , his first reports, military and political, arrived in Prague. By the spring of Sedlacek had begun to feel uneasy in Zurich, which was swarming with German agents.

He moved to Lucerne, where Lucy was living. The two met because both used journalism as cover. His information came from Hausamann, who got it from Lucy, who in turn decided what information would go to which recipients.

From 19 May to 6 September Lucy was under arrest, charged with passing intelligence to the Soviet and British services.

From the date of his arrest, the flow of Lucy's information from Sedlacek to London stopped completely and finally. It is thus established that information from Lucy to both the East and the West had ceased before the 20th of July and that therefore Lucy's sources could have been among the conspirators.

Sedlacek did continue to transmit other information to London until the war ended, but after Lucy's arrest Sedlacek's reporting deteriorated rapidly in both quality and quantity.

How he was instrumental in launching Roessler upon the second phase of his career in espionage is reported below. Earlier in this account, in a section dealing with Dr.

Josef Wirth, a message of 5 October , Dora to Director, was cited. Included therein was this statement: Vladimir Sokolin spelled Sokoline in some accounts may have been the alias of one Vladimir Shapiro or Schapiro.

Or Shapiro may have been alias, and Sokolin the true name. We shall call him Sokolin. The records which concern him are extensive but have not been summarized here because all available information indicates that he was not a part of the Rote Drei.

But either the split was unreal, designed to strengthen cover, or it was patched up and healed, because the reports of Sokolin's war time activities clearly indicate espionage conducted on behalf of the USSR.

It was also reported that through one of these contacts he asked Rado if he could be of service and that Rado relayed the suggestion to Moscow, where it was rejected.

There are clear indications that Sokolin was engaged in economic espionage for the USSR after the war ended. It appears, then, that in this instance as in others, Soviet intelligence tried not to mix their networks, the security of which required separation.

He had attended the Universities of Koenigsberg, Berlin, and Vienna, majoring in drama and intending to direct plays, an ambition which he had to abandon when the Nazis seized power.

He first met Rudolf Roessler, who was equally interested in drama, in Berlin in By the beginning of the following year he had persuaded Roessler and his wife to move to Lucerne.

Schnieper also went back to Switzerland and found employment in Lucerne as a librarian. By October he was a member of a leftist Catholic group which twice a month published, a news sheet called Entscheidung Decision.

Sedlacek knew Schnieper well. He also knew that by the time the war ended, both Schnieper and Roessler were plagued by financial problems.

Both were struggling to make ends meet as free-lance journalists. In the summer of Wolf asked Schnieper to ask Roessler whether he was willing to resume intelligence work.

With Schnieper serving as intermediary, Roessler supplied the Czechs and thus the Soviets—with information, mostly military, on the forces, dispositions, weapons, etc.

They were sentenced by a Swiss court on 5 November to a year and nine months respectively; but the time already spent in detention, nine months for each, was counted.

Released in early , Roessler died in This bald account sounds mundane—a trivial, almost irrelevant epilogue to the glamorous days of World War II. Yet a moment's reflection shows that such a view is unjustified.

Lucy's first phase lasted for only a little more than two years, his second for six. The second phase lacks the high drama of the first, but the fact remains that Roessler and Schnieper delivered valuable classified information to the Soviets, via the Czechs, in the post-war period as well.

And the intriguing question of sources looms large in both phases. Moreover, it is not likely that the two periods are unconnected.

Lucy obviously had human sources for his reporting, even though his defense heavily stressed the amount of information that he had gleaned from the newspapers.

If we can unearth some of these people, we can expect to find links to the sources of One contact, according to newspaper accounts of the trial, was a Mrs.

Theresa Hildebrand of the staff of a Chicago magazine called Common Cause. Roessler asked the Czechs if they wanted to add 1, francs monthly to his pay so that he could extend his coverage to the USA through Mrs.

Hildebrand and her contacts. The indictment of Roessler said, however, that he had merely copied the names of Mrs. Hildebrand and others from Common Cause and that they were not implicated.

A professional source who examined some of the microfilmed reports prepared by Roessler and Schnieper for passage to Prague concluded that part of these had come not only from the Blank office 39 but specifically from the office of Joachim Oster, the son of General Hans Oster.

Joachim Oster, usually called Achim, was born on 20 February in Dresden. He entered the army in as an officer candidate with the Second Artillery Regiment.

He was promoted to first lieutenant in , to captain in , to major in He attained general's rank during the post-war years.

In he began work as secretary to Dr. Josef Mueller, who was a friend of his father and a member of the 20th of July group.

Oster held this position for at least six years. In Joachim Oster was appointed to the Blank Office. In January he was transferred to other, presumably less sensitive, duties in the Ministry of Defense.

There he reportedly established contact with the old Spanish Loyalist, Gil Robles. The unidentified contact of Roessler who reported in that Goerdeler, Gisevius, "General Boelitz," and "the predecessor of Canaris" were World War II sources of Lucy, also said that as of the reporting date Roessler was still in contact with one Lemmer, who was either in the Blank Office or who had a contact therein.

Thormann is believed to be Dr. He was born in Germany, acquired Austrian citizenship through naturalization, but until remained mainly in Germany, where he was chief editor of the weekly Deutsche Republik and the Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung.

At an undetermined time he served Dr. Josef Wirth as his secretary, probably during Wirth's period. After the Nazis' seizure of power he moved to Paris, and from September to May he was an editor and speaker on the German Freedom Station there.

As of April he was the editor of Zukunft Future. He died sometime before When Hitler came to power, the Institute moved to Geneva. In Horkheimer came to the US and there established the main offices of the Institute under the sponsorship of Columbia University.

By he was attempting to reestablish a branch of the Institute at Frankfurt am Main, and by the following year he was a member of the faculty of the University of Frankfurt.

There are reports that he is or was a fellow-traveller, once closely associated with the Lenin Institute of Moscow; that he has or has had Soviet intelligence ties; and that be had been considered for the position of psychological advisor to the West German Defense Ministry Amt Blank although he was an opponent of the Bonn government.

And if he did so, the system of communication remains unknown. There is, however, a difficulty, a blur in the logic, inherent in the assumption that Josef Wirth, Joachim Oster, possibly Josef Mueller, Ernst Lemmer, Werner Thormann, and Max Horkheimer were Lucy's sources, or among those sources, during the period of During this period the Soviets could have established contact with any of them much more simply and directly than through a procedure whereby they met with Roessler in Germany or Switzerland, Roessler passed reports to Schnieper and thus the Czechs, and the Czech service gave the product to the Soviets.

Lemmer, in particular, was far better placed than Roessler to serve as the central collection point. The question may be partly resolved by one of Roessler's major courtroom arguments in his defense.

He maintained that almost every thing that he sold to the Czechs was compiled from overt sources, chiefly newspapers, and that the information given to him by his German friends was much less important.

The claim may be true, for people who knew Lucy considered him a truthful man. The remainder of the answer is that the act of providing Lucy with intelligence would in no way have precluded the direct provision of the same or other information by the same sources to Soviet intelligence officers, or to both German services, East and West, or to practically anyone else.

For these men, Lucy included, were great equivocators, adept, as the German phrase has it, at carrying water on both shoulders. There can be no doubt that Lucy himself was motivated chiefly, if not entirely, by mercenary considerations.

Here are a few excerpts from the traffic flowing between Moscow and Rado:. Agree to buy Plan Ostwall for 5, francs. Does Lucy know whether these documents are genuine and reliable?

Please tell Lucy in our name that We are ready to reward him richly for his information. During the post-war phase Lucy submitted somewhat more than one hundred reports.

He and Scbnieper were paid a total sum of between 33, and 48, Swiss francs. Lucy kept three-fourths of this sum. His record suggests that he became a Soviet agent of influence in the early 's.

A year or two after the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo he made the first of several trips to the USSR, where he conducted financial negotiations involving forestry rights and the construction of a railroad.

He was pleased that German men and officers were being trained on Russian soil, in evasion of the Versailles Treaty, even though his own regime was called the "government of fulfillment" because it was supposedly carrying out all of its obligations under that treaty.

Yet he was also in contact with Walter Schellenberg, through Richard Grossmann and perhaps in other ways as well.

Was be, then, withholding from the SD his relationship with the Soviets, as well as what he knew about the 20th of July conspirators?

The answer to the first part of this question is probably yes, but the same cannot be said about the second, at least not with much assurance. Himmler was prepared to listen to proposals that were treasonable from a Nazi point of view whenever he deemed the circumstances secure.

There are clear indications in the record that he envisaged himself as Hitler's successor. He once told Canaris that he knew perfectly well the identities of all the anti-Hitler plotters.

In short, if Wirth and others were betraying the conspiracy to Schellenberg, they were also being double-crossed by Himmler who hoped that the plan to assassinate the Fuehrer would succeed.

The Soviets, the SD—anyone else? In he made a trip to Paris in order to inform the French government personally of the military situation in Germany after the invasion of Norway.

He made similar trips after the war. There is a report of contact with the Deuxieme Bureau. Hans Bernd Gisevius joined the Nazis, worked in the German police and the Ministry of the Interior, yet joined the 20th of July plotters.

He supplied the British with intelligence for three and a half years before the war and during its initial phase.

He then became a major OSS contact. There are only uncertain indications that he was linked to the Rote Drei. One source reported that Gisevius had contact with Rado.

His relations with the Swiss police were excellent, and he was on good terms with quite a few Swiss businessmen, one of whom was Emil Georg Buehrle of the Oerlikon machine and tool works.

His ties to the courier Karl Forstmann have been noted earlier in this account. We know that Gisevius had intelligence contacts with the Western Allies.

Roessler listed Gisevius as a source. There are indications that he knew some members of the Rote Drei net and may himself have been alias "Rot" of that group.

But are there also valid indications that despite the confidence which Hans Oster, Goerdeler, and others in the Loth of July group seem to have accorded him, he may have been an RSHA agent too?

One report stated that Himmler's secretary had so identified him. Some post-war interrogations of German intelligence officers include their comments that Ernst Kaltenbrunner, RSHA chief and Schellenberg's superior, received reports from Gisevius as late as April The record contains other references to links between Gisevius and Heydrich, as well as Gisevius and Schellenberg.

Such reports, however, are likely to be unreliable. All 20th of July participants became unpopular with most Germans.

When Gisevius went to the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials in as a witness for Hjalmar Schacht, he became also a highly effective witness for the prosecution, hence doubly unpopular in post-war Germany.

That some denunciations were inspired by rancour therefore seems highly probable. At first blush it appears odd that he was allowed to remain as a German intelligence officer in Switzerland after the RSHA assimilated the Abwehr, despite the fact that the Gestapo issued an arrest order for him in August But it should be recalled that Goerdeler, sentenced on 8 September , was not executed until February because Himmler hoped that the contacts of such men with the Western Allies might save his own skin later.

On balance, then, it is considered that Gisevius had intelligence contacts with the Americans, the British, the Swiss, and perhaps the Soviets, but not with Nazi Germany, except for his major role in the resistance.

This account has said next to nothing about the Swiss role in the drama of the Rote Drei. Today Switzerland tends to seem just the scenery of the story: But this aura of passivity, of being uninvolved, is really illusory.

The fact is that certain Swiss officers were very directly a part of the activity of the Rote Drei. Understandably, this involvement remains a source of some concern to the Swiss, even today, because it is at odds with that strict neutrality which Switzerland has proclaimed for centuries as buckler and breast-plate.

The traffic, however—that obdurate record on which we have tried to base as much of this account as possible—plainly reveals Swiss involvement.

When arrests were made, Moscow asked why Rote Drei members in contact with the Swiss authorities—Lucy, Pakbo, Long—did not get more information from them.

Lucy's contacts with Swiss military intelligence preceded his work in the Rote Drei, and the same is very likely true of Pakbo and certain others.

At least two Swiss officers should be mentioned here. The first is Brigadier Colonel Roger Masson, now dead, who was the chief of Swiss wartime intelligence.

The second is Major Hans Hausamann. Before World War lI began, Hausamann had recognized that Switzerland, already teeming with the spies of other nations, was itself sadly lacking in military intelligence and in sources to provide it.

In Teufen, near St. Gallen, be established an unofficial intelligence center, funded actually or nominally by himself and certain friends.

When war came, this office, known as the "Bureau Ha," was linked to the official Swiss Army intelligence structure.

Quite deliberately, however, the Swiss chieftains did not incorporate the office into the army but left it largely autonomous.

It is reasonable to conjecture that this preservation of unofficial or only semi-official status resulted chiefly from the significant fact that a Bureau Ha outside the official framework could be far freer of the shackles imposed by neutrality than any part of the government could be.

Xaver Schnieper worked as a junior officer in the Bureau Ha. He introduced Lucy to Major Hausamann. Only the Swiss know today whether the vital information coming from Germany went first to Lucy and then, via Hausamann, to Masson, or whether the Swiss received the bulk of the information from their sources in Germany and passed it to Sedlacek for relay to the British and to Lucy for relay to the Russians.

What we can be sure of is that Switzerland was not just part of the World War II scenery; it had a piece of the action. The story of the Rote Drei in essence, is the tale of two firm camps, between which shuttled ambiguous and uncommitted men.

On the one side stood the anti-Hitler German conspirators. There was an East-West schism in their ranks, but they were united and unwavering in their resolve to rid Germany and the world of Hitler.

On the other were the Soviet armed forces and intelligence services, also committed to Hitler's destruction but only as a step toward the same domination of the earth that Hitler had longed for.

Both groups, the tiny and the vast, were made up for the most part of dedicated activists. Between the two forces were Roessler and certain of his associates: During the period, at least, Lucy, Lemmer, et al , were psychologically much more akin to Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, and Schellenberg than to the heroes of the resistance, the Soviets, or even such Rote Drei figures as Rachel Duebendorfer.

These were the men who posed as arbiters, as intellectuals who had preserved their integrity by being above it all. But the truth is that they did not say, "A plague on both your houses.

They sought advantage—private material advantage—from many quarters. Roessler, Blun, Lemmer, and the rest could have been replaced by any others willing and able to live well in wartime Switzerland; their roles were essential, though not very important, but they themselves, as individuals, were not of consequence.

The true heroes of the tale are those few Germans living in an age of appalling complexity, and of rottenness at the highest levels of their government, so that they were forced not only to risk a barbaric death but to deal unequivocally with the fact that what morality demanded of them was treason.

A few of them were Lt. Only the books and other publications consulted directly during the preparation of this article have been listed in this bibliography.

Moskau Wusste Alles , translated from the French by R. Humm, Schweizer Verlag A. The Lucy Ring , translated from the French by A.

A Man Called Lucy , translated by A. This article is an abridgement of a longer study of the Rote Drei. The portions omitted in this version mainly concern biographical and other details relating to the sources and sub-sources of the principals in the organization.

On the other hand, no messages from Moscow to Switzerland were found at the Hamels'. An analysis of all traffic presently available has suggested that about two-fifths originated in Moscow.

If therefore we add 1, to our projection 40 per cent of 4, the total becomes 5, It is suspected that the remaining 6 messages are spurious, the creations of Flicke or someone else.

These messages differ from those known to be authentic in certain minor ways but consistently. United States Government USG organizations need better language capabilities to address military, diplomatic, commercial, medical, and similar professional requirements.

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